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‘A heavy yock uppon their necks’:  
Covenanting Government in the Northern Highlands, 1638-16511 
The development of ‘states’ has long been a dominant theme in the 
historiography of seventeenth-century Europe, and in recent years, the relationship 
between central government and peripheral regions has emerged as one of the most 
significant components of the discourse.  The resultant historiography is highly 
complex, not least because the details of centre-locality relations naturally differed 
between states, but two general theoretical models can nevertheless be discerned.  The 
first, and much the longer-established, adopts what may be termed an ‘imperial’ 
approach to state consolidation, characterising the relationship as a predatory one in 
which drives towards assimilation came from the centre, often with the interests of the 
core dominating those of the locality.  Alain Lottin, for example, in his assessment of 
Louis XIV’s policies towards Flanders, points out that the Sun King lavished attention 
on the religious, political and social life of the conquered lands, all aiming ‘to 
integrate Flanders progressively to the French administrative monarchy’ and ‘provide 
it with institutions typical of the French monarchy’.2  The ‘imperial’ model has 
proved particularly attractive to historians of Swedish imperialism, and Anthony 
Upton argues that Charles XI adopted a policy of ‘enforced assimilation’ in Skåne 
which succeeded in sidelining the Danish elite of the province and merging it into the 
Swedish polity.3  The second approach follows a ‘collaborative’ line, maintaining, in 
the phrase of Jeremy Black, that ‘rulers were dependent on local institutions and also 
1 I would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for their generous financial assistance in the 
preparation of this article.  I am also grateful to Dr Alastair Mann for his help and guidance, and to the anonymous 
referees who provided many useful and thought-provoking comments on an earlier draft.  Any errors remain my 
responsibility alone. 
2 Lottin, A., 'Louis XIV and Flanders' in Greengrass, M. (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the 
State in Early Modern Europe (Sevenoaks, 1991), pp.84-93, at pp.84-93. 
3 Upton, A., Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism (Cambridge, 1998), pp.179-85. 
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sought the cooperation of the locally influential’.4  Ideas like these have been put into 
practice by a diverse range of scholars, including Henry Kamen, who argues that late-
Habsburg Spain ‘continued to be governed as it had been under Philip II, by a kind of 
consensus between various local interests’.5  One must be careful of painting too 
black-and-white a picture, however, since the ‘imperial’ and ‘collaborative’ lines are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive.  Charles Ingrao, for example, maintains that the 
Habsburg monarchy was able simultaneously to pursue a harsh ‘imperial’ policy 
towards Hungary and a more subtle ‘collaborative’ strategy in Bohemia.6  All this 
makes for a rich and stimulating historiographical corpus which has done much to 
highlight the complexity of the state-building process in the early-modern period. 
The centre-periphery issue is also of importance in a specifically British 
context, and has fomented significant debate between historians such as Michael 
Hechter and Jane Ohlmeyer, who profess an ‘imperial’ understanding of Anglo-Irish 
and Anglo-Scottish relations, and others, like John Morrill and Jim Smyth, who prefer 
a more contingent model that emphasises the interplay between English, Scottish and 
Irish interests, if not necessarily the equality of the three.7  In purely Scottish terms, 
the Highlands are invariably identified as the most significant candidate for peripheral 
status.  On the ‘imperial’ side of the fence, Julian Goodare states quite baldly that ‘the 
region was to be treated as a colonial province, in which government was carried out 
for the benefit of the core state’.8  By contrast, Allan Macinnes places greater 
emphasis on the role of the locality: 
                                                 
4 Black, J., Kings, Nobles and Commoners: States and Societies in Early Modern Europe (London, 2004), p.27. 
5 Kamen, H., Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century 1665-1700 (London, 1980), pp.16-7. 
6 Ingrao, C., The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815 (Cambridge, 1994) (Cambridge, 1994). 
7 Ohlmeyer, J., ‘ “Civilizinge of those rude partes”: Colonization within Britain and Ireland, 1580s-1640s’ in 
Canny, N. (ed.), The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century 
(Oxford, 1998); Hechter, M., Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 
(London, 1975); Morrill, J., ‘The British Problem, c.1534-1707’ in Bradshaw, B., and Morrill, J. (eds.), The British 
Problem, c.1534-1707 (Basingstoke, 1996); Smyth, J., The Making of the United Kingdom, 1660-1800: State, 
Religion and Identity in Britain and Ireland (Harlow, 2009). 
8 Goodare, J., State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford, 1999), p.280. 
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Chiefs and leading clan gentry ... had come to recognise the political, social and 
economic advantages of supporting the Scottish Crown and were seeking to 
ingratiate themselves at Court.9 
 
The issue of centre-periphery interaction in the Highlands carries a particular 
significance for the mid-seventeenth-century, when it intersects with another 
historiographical debate regarding the strength and support-base of the Covenanting 
movement.  Broadly, historians of the topic have tended to adopt one of three 
approaches.  Firstly, John Roberts argues that Highland involvement – restricted, 
according to him, to the Royalist rebellion of 1644-6 – was essentially coincidental, 
brought about simply because it was within Gaeldom that James Graham, marquess of 
Montrose and Alasdair MacColla recruited their men.10  Secondly, Edward Cowan, 
while accepting that Highland involvement in the conflict was intentional, maintains 
that the clans ‘seized upon the excuse of raising musters for one side or the other, to 
indulge in private feud or vendettas’.11  This assessment has recently been restated by 
Sherrilynn Theiss, whose discussion is based upon a variation of the ‘imperial’ 
approach; she argues that the policies of James VI, embodied in the Statutes of Iona 
(1609), had begun to ‘civilise’ the western elite and integrate them into the wider 
Scottish polity, but were allowed to lapse by Charles I and the Covenanters.12  The 
result was complete dislocation between central government and the western clans, 
whose behaviour became increasingly autonomous and whose interests reverted to the 
purely local.  All this leads Theiss to reiterate the idea of opportunistic involvement, 
                                                 
9 Macinnes, A.I., Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (East Linton, 1996), p.56. 
10 Roberts, J.L., Clan, King and Covenant: History of the Highland Clans from the Civil War to the Glencoe 
Massacre (Edinburgh, 2000), p.83. 
11 Cowan, E.J., Montrose: For Covenant and King (Edinburgh, 1977), p.181. 
12 Theiss, S., ‘The Western Highlands and Isles, 1616-1649: Allegiances during the “Scottish Troubles”’ 
(University of Edinburgh, Ph.D. Thesis, 2006), pp.88-95. 
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predicated on the perceptions that Royalism offered the best means both of 
undermining the power of Clan Campbell and of alleviating the severe indebtedness 
that burdened most families.13   
 The third approach is that of Edward Furgol, who argues that the constancy of 
some family loyalties was such that only genuine ideological attachment, and not 
cynical opportunism, can explain it.14  The distinctiveness of Furgol’s position is 
largely rooted in the fact that, unlike Roberts, Cowan and Theiss, his focus is on the 
northern Highlands rather than on the west.  This in turn illustrates an important 
deficiency in the historiography of the Covenanting-era Highlands; the overwhelming 
focus on the west (which in this context essentially means Argyll and Lochaber) has 
led to the trends of west Highland society frequently being taken as emblematic of the 
whole region.  Furgol’s work underlines just how erroneous such as approach may be, 
and the present article seeks to build upon his foundation through a detailed study of 
the far north.  Encompassing the five northernmost shires of the mainland (Inverness, 
Ross, Cromarty, Sutherland, and Caithness), it will seek to understand how the 
Covenanting authorities addressed the centre-periphery issue through considering a 
range of themes in turn.  These are, firstly, the degree of local political autonomy in 
the region, including an assessment of how meaningful was the distinction between 
‘Highlands’ and ‘Lowlands’ in the context of the far north; secondly, the general 
governmental superstructure imposed after 1638; thirdly, the role of local elites in 
government, incorporating a quantitative analysis of office-holding patterns; and 
fourthly, the importance of Covenanting and Royalist ideology in the north.  Such an 
analysis will allow for a rounded picture of how the government in Edinburgh 
interacted with the locality, which will in turn make a contribution to existing 
                                                 
13 Ibid., pp.95-113, p.119 and at pp.184-5. 
14 Furgol, E.M., 'The Northern Highland Covenanter Clans, 1639-1651', Northern Scotland, 7, 2, 1987, p.129. 
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knowledge about the nature of the revolutionary regime. 
Running through virtually every text dealing with Highland history is the 
concept that there existed in the region distinctive, ‘Gaelic’ forms of social 
organisation (‘the clan system’) and lordly culture which implied a degree of political 
autonomy from central government.  Theiss for one is unequivocal in her contention 
that the decay of Jacobean ‘civilising’ policies after 1625 meant that western clans 
had no interest in the affairs of the core state.15  The most exhaustive study of Gaelic 
lordly culture has come from Dodgshon, who has argued that Gaelic lordship relied 
on an extensive range of display behaviours (including feasting, hospitality and war-
making) related, directly or indirectly, to the control of foodstuffs.16  There is clearly 
some evidence that this kind of activity retained a degree of vitality in the western 
zone of the northern Highlands.  Food-related competition remained endemic, so that 
Gaelic raiding deprived John Gordon, 13th earl of Sutherland and his tenants of no 
fewer than 1,770 cattle, horses and goats from various estates in Strathnaver, Breachat 
and Auchness during 1645 and 1646, while the clansmen of Ewan Cameron of 
Lochiel raided the lands of the laird of Moyness in 1645.17  Slightly differently, 
George Mackenzie, 2nd earl of Seaforth’s role as a clan chief came to the fore in 1644 
when the threat of Alasdair MacColla caused him to abandon a commission awarded 
by Parliament in order to protect his west-coast kin and clients.18  Yet the most 
striking illustration of a distinctly Gaelic approach to lordship was the use of banding, 
described by Macinnes as ‘an insurance mechanism ... to pre-empt the escalation of 
                                                 
15 Theiss, ‘Western Highlands and Isles’, p.85. 
16 Dodgshon, R.A., From Chiefs to Landlords: Social and Economic Change in the Western Highlands and 
Islands, c.1493-1820 (Edinburgh, 1998), pp.84-98. 
17 Brown, K.M. et al (eds.), The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707 (St Andrews, 2007), 
www.rps.ac.uk, 1649/1/78; Fraser, W. (ed.), The Chiefs of Grant, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1883), ii, p.76-7. 
18 MacGill, W. (ed.), Old Ross-shire and Scotland as seen in the Tain and Balnagown Documents, 2 vols 
(Edinburgh, 1909-11), i, p.221. 
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minor disputes into major herschips’.19  One such band was concluded between 
Seaforth and Archibald Campbell, lord Lorne (the future marquess of Argyll) in 1638, 
by which both parties promised to ‘enter and become in the reall true and legall bond 
of amitie love and freindship’ and to assist each other in all lawful affairs, all because 
‘our conjunctur and keeping of freindship may verie much tend to the advancement of 
Religione [and] the Kings Maj[es]ties service’.20  This was not an isolated case – the 
Mackay gentry entered into a band of loyalty in 1645, pledging to resist Covenanting 
aggression, while an agreement in 1649 saw Donald Mackay, 1st lord Reay recognise 
Sutherland’s superiority in return for a pledge of security.21  Banding had been a 
marked feature of Scottish lordly culture in the later middle ages, and its decline in the 
Lowlands is often taken to signal the rise of independent state power.22  Its persistence 
in the north-west is emblematic of an autonomous lordship style that continued to 
thrive in the west and which, in line with Theiss’s assessment, had the potential both 
to foment disorder and act as a standing challenge to the authority of government. 
Crucially though, the families of the eastern seaboard had long been conduits 
for the penetration of Lowland values and lordly culture.  The Sinclairs of Caithness, 
for example, were not unique in being Anglo-Norman in origin rather than Gaelic, 
and had established a solid network of Lowland marriage alliances since acquiring 
their earldom in 1455, linking them to the Keith, Graham, Hepburn and Gordon 
families.23  By the same token, the Sutherland Gordons were an off-shoot of the 
House of Huntly.  As a result, the behaviour of these eastern families during the 1640s 
was largely indistinguishable from that of Lowland lords.  The tomb built in 1642 for 
                                                 
19 Macinnes, Clanship, p.10. 
20 National Library of Scotland, Advocates Mss, Ch.A.126. 
21 National Archives of Scotland, Mackay of Reay Papers, GD84/2/201, GD84/2/210. 
22 For background discussion of bonding, and the associated issues of feuding, see Wormald, J., Lords and Men in 
Scotland: Bonds of Manret, 1442-1603 (Edinburgh, 1985) and Brown, K.M., Bloodfeud in Scotland 1573-1625: 
Violence, Justice and Politics in an Early Modern Society (Edinburgh, 1986) 
23 Paul, J.B. (ed.), The Scots Peerage: A History of the Noble Families of Scotland, 9 vols, ii, pp.337-43. 
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Christian Mowatt, lady Dunbeath, included such refinements as wall recesses 
corniced with crowns and shields and a window arch containing a portrait of the 
occupant at prayer.24  David Ross of Balnagown maintained an account with the 
merchant John Lauder throughout the 1640s, and his orders included £71 of fine 
Spanish cloth and dozens of silver buttons for himself, 19 ells of black pink satin for 
his wife, and a mixture of coloured silk, calico and taffeta for his children.25  The 
Frasers maintained notaries in Lovat and Stratherrik, while in 1649 their salmon 
fishery at Beauly reportedly sold 9,000 merks of fish to Aberdeen traders.26  Most 
striking of all were the Urquharts of Cromarty, whose head for most of the 
Covenanting period – Sir Thomas Urquhart – was emphatically not a parochial 
Highland lord, let alone a Gaelic chief.  He studied at Aberdeen University, travelled 
extensively in England and Europe (indeed, he was almost entirely absent from 
Cromarty until 1645) and wrote a range of eccentric academic treatises, including his 
Epigrams (1641) and Trissotetras (1645).27  The families of the eastern seaboard thus 
had firm and long-standing links with wider Scottish culture and society.  These were 
not ‘clans’ in the pure sense as described by Dodgshon, but Lowland-style families 
whose territories happened to lie within the Highlands. 
 Historians have long recognised this division between ‘Gaelic’ and ‘Scots’ 
lordly culture, which has led to a good deal of confusion over how to conceptualise 
the far north, and indeed the Highlands more generally, in relation to the wider 
Scottish polity.  The simplest solution has been the idea of the ‘Highland Line’, a 
sharp demarcation indicating where one culture zone ended and another began 
adopted, for example, by Macinnes in his visual representations of clan distribution 
                                                 
24 NAS, Sinclair of Caithness Papers, GD96/573. 
25 MacGill, Old Ross, i, pp.142-3. 
26 Fraser, J., Chronicles of the Frasers: The Wardlaw Manuscript Entitled 'Polichronicon Seu Policratica 
Temporum, or, The True Genealogy of the Frasers', 916-1674, ed. Mackay, W. (Edinburgh, 1905), p.309 and at 
p.345. 
27 Stevenson, D., King or Covenant? Voices from Civil War (East Linton, 1996), pp.115-32. 
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within Gaeldom.28  Yet the question of where to draw the divide between ‘Gaelic’ and 
‘Scots’ lordship is something of a red herring for the far north, because there was in 
fact no clear distinction.  The two lordly cultures could and frequently had 
intermingled prior to the Covenanting revolution, and they continued to do so.  East-
coast lords were not above adopting Gaelic displays; Hugh Fraser, 7th lord Lovat 
marked the marriage of his son in 1642 with a parade of 400 fully armed Highland 
warriors, while the laird of Kilravock advertised his wealth by offering hospitality so 
lavish that his house became known as ‘a comon Inn where all were welcome’.29  
Equally, ‘Gaelic’ chiefs in the west were often adept at copying the behaviours of 
Lowland lordship.  Reay acted as the King’s Lieutenant Governor in the north, and in 
1646 was comfortable enough in that role to issue a Commission of Fire and Sword 
against the Covenanters of Sutherland and Caithness.30  Similarly, John Macleod of 
Dunvegan in 1649 exploited the fact that his lands had been on the front-line against 
Alasdair MacColla by persuading Parliament to exempt him for his tax liabilities.31  
The penetration of Lowland ideas from the east should therefore be seen as producing, 
long before 1638, a cultural greyscale in which many of the elite behaved as both 
Lowland lords and Highland chiefs, with the balance clearly varying between regions 
and kindreds.  Methodologically this means that the northern Highlands would benefit 
from a holistic approach that neither imposes artificial distinctions between social 
groups nor prejudges the historical record by assuming that the eastern and western 
seaboards behaved in fundamentally different ways.  In terms of the political 
independence thesis, it should be recognised that the distinctive character that north 
Highland lordship clearly boasted by the Covenanting period did not mean that lords 
                                                 
28 Macinnes, Clanship, pp.242-6.  These maps are in fact rather misleading because, in his prose analysis, 
Macinnes does not really accept the idea of an easily identifiable ‘Highland Line’ 
29 Fraser, Wardlaw, p.278; Rose, H., A Genealogical Deduction of the Family of Rose of Kilravock ed. Innes, C. 
(Edinburgh, 1848), p.91. 
30 NAS, GD84/2/203. 
31 RPS, 1649/1/409. 
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were culturally isolated from wider Scottish society, or that the ability to think and 
behave in a ‘Gaelic’ manner necessarily implied autonomy from central government. 
 Also of critical importance to the conventional assessment of Highland 
estrangement from central authority is the idea that inter-family relations were an 
inherent source of destabilisation.  The main issue is feuding, and Stevenson goes so 
far as to argue that ‘inter-clan wars ... became endemic in the Highlands.’32  Theiss 
concurs with reference to the west, and views feuding as emblematic of the lack of 
any substantial relationship between centre and periphery.33  Much the most 
significant northern feud in the Covenanting period was that between the Mackays of 
Reay and the Sutherland Gordons, already traditional enemies since at least the reign 
of Mary.  Land was at the centre of the dispute, specifically Strathnaver, the Mackay 
heartlands over which Sutherland had claimed superiority since 1642.34  In 1647 for 
example, the Mackays were forced to acknowledge Sutherland as their superior and 
agree to ‘consent to the possessioun of the Landis off Strathnaver dispondit be ws To 
the Earle off Su[the]rland To be sett according to his pleass[u]r’.35  Typically for a 
feud, both sides used violence to further their causes.  The Mackays were accused of 
committing ‘wrongs, oppressiounes and robberies’ against Sutherland and ‘uptaking 
of the rents and dewties of [his] lands…with there friends and a great number of Irish 
rebells’, and Sutherland reportedly maintained a standing force of 400 men.36  A 
complicating factor was that the Mackays were Royalist while Sutherland was one of 
the most consistently Covenanting nobleman in Scotland, with the exception of 
Argyll.  Inevitably, the government got involved on Sutherland’s behalf, showering 
him with money, men and supplies.  In 1647, for instance, Parliament awarded the 
                                                 
32 Stevenson, D., Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 1980), p.19. 
33 Theiss, ‘Western Highlands and Isles’, p.97. 
34 Grimble, I., Chief of Mackay (Edinburgh, 1993), p.151. 
35 NAS, GD84/2/207A. 
36 RPS, 1649/1/67. 
 10 
earl obtain 200 muskets, 200 swords and 100 cannonballs, along with a party of 500 
soldiers to supplement his own forces.37  The dispute was all but over by the middle 
of 1649, when the adherence of the 2nd lord Reay to the pseudo-Royalist rising led by 
Thomas Mackenzie of Pluscarden led to his imprisonment.  Other family conflict also 
reignited during this period – between, for example, Macleods and Mackenzies or 
Mackenzies and Frasers – but the Gordon-Mackay struggle is the most striking 
illustration of both the challenges and opportunities that feuding presented to the 
government.  Violence and disorder were unavoidable consequences, and sponsorship 
of one side or the other did result in the diversion of public resources into private 
hands.  But the fact that ante bellum conflicts tended to mirror the fault-line between 
Covenanting and Royalist ideology (or, perhaps more accurately, vice-versa) meant 
that the government could align itself with the interests of its clients in the locality 
and thereby augment its own ability to enforce conformity.  Feuding was a threat to 
the rule of law; it was also an ideal opportunity for the Covenanters to exploit the 
political climate of the locality in order to root out dissenting elements. 
 In any case, it is important to recognise that feuding was atypical,38 and under 
normal circumstances inter-family relations were far less disruptive.  It was perfectly 
possible for disagreements to be settled peacefully through arbitration.  In late 1639, 
for example, Kilravock and Rory Mackenzie of Redcastle agreed to settle a border 
dispute by referring it to a panel of ‘freindis, arbitratoures, newtrallie and 
indifferentlie electit, nominat and chosin…for cognoscing, satling and desyding of the 
controuerse of the merches betwixt the landis of Leadanache and Torgormach’.39  
Moreover, the likelihood of friction emerging in the first place was significantly 
                                                 
37 RPS, 1646/11/537; NAS, Register of the Committee of Estates, PA11/5, f.13r. 
38 It could be argued that the oft-repeated assertion that feuding was endemic to Highland Scotland is another 
symptom of the over-analysis of the Campbell-dominated west at the expense of other areas.  
39 Rose, Genealogical Deduction, pp.325-6. 
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lessened by a number of mechanisms for forging alliances.  In 1641, for instance, 
Sutherland attempted to win the friendship of Balnagown by sharing information:  
 
Witness my rediliness to do you service, this day I have learned [tha]t ane 
partie of Sinclair’s Shouldiours should goe to ... your bounds to help 
Commis[sione]r Cochren to tak up the tenth and twentie pennie.40 
 
The most fundamental tool, however, was marriage, and indeed the network of 
marriage alliances in place in the 1640s was labyrinthine in the extreme.  Lovat 
married daughters to Sutherland, Balnagown and Sir John Sinclair of Dunbeath; a 
niece of Seaforth’s married John Sinclair, master of Berriedale; Reay married a 
second niece of Seaforth’s, while his daughter married Sir Roderick Macleod of 
Talisker and his son married Berriedale’s aunt.41  These were often major 
undertakings.  The marriage of Katherine Fraser to Dunbeath in 1643, for the 
celebration of which Lovat travelled personally to Dunrobin, was accompanied by a 
lengthy contract that included a tocher of £10,000 and Katherine’s investment in life-
rent with the barony of Dunbeath.42  In return, marriages could offer useful diplomatic 
channels.  A dispute in 1643 between Sutherland and Balnagown, relating to the theft 
of some of the former’s horses, was moved towards resolution because Sutherland’s 
wife, Anna Fraser, was able to open a dialogue with Balnagown while visiting her 
sister, Mary Fraser, to whom Balnagown was married.43  If the Gordon-Mackay 
conflict illustrates the difficulties inherent in feuding, the far more typical reliance on 
                                                 
40 MacGill, Old Ross, i, p.219. 
41 Paul, Peerage, passim.  For the wider issue of noble marriage patterns, see Brown, K.M., Nobel Society in 
Scotland: Wealth, Family and Culture from Reformation to Revolution (Edinburgh, 2000). 
42 Fraser, Wardlaw, pp.284-5; NAS, GD96/576. 
43 NLS, Sutherland Papers, Dep.313, f.490. 
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peaceful interaction shows that internecine conflict was not the ever-present threat to 
order and stability that has traditionally been supposed.   
More than either cultural estrangement or internecine conflict, kinship is the 
feature of Highland lordship that is usually considered to set it apart.  The exercise of 
authority in the north was certainly complicated by the existence of kin networks, 
which can be characterised in part as private support systems.  For the leadership, this 
meant a ready stock of servants.  In 1640, John Grant of Freuchie sent letters to three 
Grant vassals requesting they persuade the ex-outlaw James Grant to set caution for 
relieving Freuchie of losses he had suffered on Grant’s behalf, while the journey in 
1642 of the master of Lovat to Edinburgh, in order to take up a commission in the 
army, was financed by contributions from the Fraser kin.44  Lesser men for their part 
enjoyed a degree of protection.  When, in 1639, four Frasers assaulted the Inverness 
burgess Jasper Cumming, they were pursued and imprisoned by a small force under 
the direction John Cuthbert, another burgess.  In retaliation, Lovat lodged a complaint 
with the Committee of Estates the following year, accusing Cuthbert of assault.45  
Emblematic of this sense of mutual obligation was the emergence in times of trouble 
of family ‘trusts’ to protect the family’s possessions.  The Rosses adopted this 
practice in 1649, when representatives of the Pitcalnie, Invercharron and Priesthill 
septs agreed on a number of measures, including household cuts and building up 
timber resources, for restoring the solvency of the Balnagown estate.46  All this could 
conflict with the rule of law.  In the early 1640s, a dispute between two members of 
the Bruce family, both claiming the lands of Stanstell in Caithness, was complicated 
by the fact that one was married to a daughter of Dunbeath, and so was able to use 
Sinclair influence to further his own claims and hinder all legal challenges mounted 
                                                 
44 Fraser, Chiefs, ii, 69; Fraser, Wardlaw, pp.279-81. 
45 Highland Council Archives, Inverness Town Council Minute Book, 1637-1655, IB1/1/4, fo.13. 
46 MacGill, Old Ross, i, p.274. 
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against him.47 
Crucially though, kinship ties were not unbreakable, and they certainly did not 
guarantee that every family maintained internal coherence in relation to the 
Covenanting-Royalist dynamic.  The Sinclair gentry were split after 1648, with the 
lairds of Canisbay, Murkle and Ulbster serving the Engagement, and a group 
including Dunbeath, Assery and Ratter adhering to the ‘Kirk Party’.48  Similarly, one 
prominent member of the staunchly Covenanting Frasers, Colonel Hugh Fraser, was 
involved in Pluscarden’s rising in 1649.49  Furthermore, family ties were not always a 
sufficient guarantee that rights and obligations would be fulfilled.  In 1640, for 
example, George Gordon, Sutherland’s brother, reported that several client families 
had abandoned the Gordons in pursuit of private enrichment, and in the same year, 
letters were issued against George Sinclair, 5th earl of Caithness, threatening him with 
horning unless he act upon an earlier promise to confirm land grants awarded to his 
brothers.50  All this indicates that the role of kinship in north Highland society was 
rather more equivocal than is often suggested.  In any case, it would be wholly 
inaccurate to suggest that kinship as a political force was restricted to the Highlands, 
and Rosalind Marshall’s classic account of the Hamilton family has highlighted the 
extent to which real and perceived ties of kinship shaped and reinforced the authority 
of that noble line.51  Kinship therefore offered northern Highlanders a comprehensive 
support system which was outwith the regime’s direct control, and with the in-built 
potential to challenge its hegemony, but this was hardly unique in a Scottish context.  
                                                 
47 Masson, D., and Hume-Brown, P. (eds.), The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, Second Series, 8 vols 
(Edinburgh, 1899-1908), vii, pp.334-5. 
48 Furgol, ‘Covenanter Clans’, p.123.  The ‘Engagement’ was an agreement in late 1647 between Charles I and a 
moderate faction of Covenanters, whereby the latter agreed to invade England in support of the king, while Charles 
agreed to accept presbyterianism in Scotland, and give it a three-year trial run in England.   
49 Fraser, Wardlaw, p.339. 
50 NAS, GD96/559. 
51 Marshall, R.K., The Days of Duchess Anne: Life in the Household of the Duchess of Hamilton, 1656-1716 (East 
Linton, 2000), pp.32-3. 
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Equally, kinship was neither sufficiently sturdy to allow complete autonomy, nor, as 
will be shown below, necessarily incompatible with the effective operation of 
government.   
Recognising that lordship in the northern Highlands was not necessarily any 
more dismissive of central government than lordly culture farther south is crucial, 
because it ties the region into one of the most significant historiographical motifs of 
the Covenanting period, namely the strongly centralising nature of the revolutionary 
regime.  A good recent example of this line of thinking is the work of John Young on 
the Scottish Parliament, which concludes that the Covenanters moulded that 
institution into one of the most powerful representative bodies in Europe.52  It is not 
difficult to understand why centralisation has been such a beguiling model, because 
the sophisticated committee structure created after 1638 was quite blatantly intended 
‘to make the localities responsive to central directives from Edinburgh’.53  Theiss 
argues that this trend was of minimal relevance to the western Highlands, where 
Edinburgh’s imposition of emergency measures to combat Montrose’s rising 
represented the only point of contact between centre and periphery.54  The situation in 
the northern Highlands was quite different, and the new structures of the Covenanting 
government were clearly influential.  It is a measure of their confidence that, in 1640, 
the Committee of War for Ross sent summonses to local luminaries, including 
Balnagown, Hector Douglas of Muldarg, and the Provost of Tain, demanding they 
attend committee meetings.55  Such consciousness of position was not without 
                                                 
52 Young, J.R., The Scottish Parliament 1639-1661: A Political and Constitutional Analysis (Edinburgh, 1996), 
p.324. Young, J.R., ‘The Scottish Parliament in the Seventeenth Century: European Perspectives’ in Macinnes, 
A.I., Riis, Y., and Pedersen, F.G. (eds.), Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the Baltic States, c.1350-
c.1700 (East Linton, 2000), p.158. 
53 Macinnes, A.I., ‘The Origin and Organization of the Covenanting Movement during the reign of Charles I, 
1625-41; with a particular reference to the west of Scotland’, 2 vols (University of Glasgow, Ph.D. Thesis, 1987), 
ii, 481. 
54 Theiss, ‘Western Highlands and Isles’, pp.113-21. 
55 MacGill, Old Ross, i, p.220. 
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justification.  In 1650, during a dispute over the glebe of Dingwall parish, the 
presbytery decided to contact the Ross-shire committee for advice.56  This willingness 
to recognise the authority of local committees was evidently matched by a respect for 
the committee structure of central government.  When Balnagown and Sutherland 
missed a rendezvous at Aberdeen arranged by the Committee of Estates in 1644, the 
two decided to meet at Dornoch and settle on a suitable explanation to give the 
Committee.57  A more negative example of Covenanting innovation can be seen in the 
fate of Justices of the Peace.  Traditionally much maligned, Justices have recently 
enjoyed something of rehabilitation thanks to Goodare, who characterises them as one 
of James VI’s more successful innovations for intruding central influence into the 
locality.58  The office, however, was one of the few swept away during the revolution, 
and even when Justices did eventually reappear, in June 1649, there is no evidence 
that they attained the kind of position outlined by Goodare.  Indeed, their striking 
absence from either state or private records makes it implausible to claim that Justices 
were ever a particularly important part of Covenanting governance.  The northern 
Highlands, then, clearly experienced the novel aspects of revolutionary rule, and had 
little compunction about engaging with them. 
Yet the importance of new developments must not be exaggerated.  Their very 
newness could be problematic, and jurisdictional uncertainty was not uncommon.  As 
late as 1651, Inverness complained that the Committee of War for Nairn had infringed 
its burgh privileges during a recent levy, since it had ‘presumed without anie warrand 
to assigne the said toune to the Laird of Grant as a part of his division’.59  The 
accustomed rights of the nobility could lead to similar tensions when they collided 
                                                 
56 Fraser, Wardlaw, p.180. 
57 MacGill, Old Ross, i, p.221. 
58 Goodare, J., The Government of Scotland 1560-1625 (Oxford, 2004), pp.203-7. 
59 NAS, PA11/10, fo.46. 
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with government attempts at administrative rationalisation.  In 1649, Hugh Fraser, 8th 
lord Lovat, sent a petition to Parliament: 
 
Q[uhai]ras the Lord Louatt hath formerlie put out his horss and foott in 
rela[t]ine to the diui[si]un betuixt the Lord Seafforth and him, q[uhi]ch albeit 
named a diui[si]une, yet trew it is thair is none contenit thairin bot thair 
freindes, q[uhai]rby The Lord Louatt and his freindis ar mightilie preiudyeit by 
thair non equallis burding [burden].60 
 
This does not mean, however, that there was an intractable tension between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ authority systems, not least because the new structures could not necessarily be 
relied upon.  In fact, by 1651 the Committee of Estates was forced to rebuke the 
Committees for both Ross and Caithness for attempting to manipulate their horse and 
foot levies.61  Moreover, the government was often quite happy to allow the 
perpetuation of accustomed structures.  In 1641, Parliament explicitly ratified the 
charters and traditional liberties appertaining to Wick, Rosmarkie and Inverness 
burghs.62  This conservatism made sense, because the revolutionary regime often 
relied heavily on pre-existing authorities.  Both the presbyteries of Inverness and 
Dingwall took active responsibility for implementing the Covenanting tax system,63 
and it is noteworthy that the newly-erected local executives were based upon the pres-
existing shire boundaries of Inverness-shire, Ross, Cromarty, Sutherland, and 
Caithness.  Goodare has advanced an imperialistic model of local government in the 
Highlands, suggesting that the centre converted landed elites into Scottish gentlemen 
                                                 
60 NAS, Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, PA7/6, fo.93. 
61 NAS, PA11/10, fo.72; fos.105-6. 
62 RPS, 1641/8/412; 1641/8/413; 1641/8/425. 
63 NAS, Minutes of the Presbytery of Inverness, CH2/553/1, 12; Mackay, W., and Laing, G.S. (ed.), Records of 
Inverness, 2 vols (Aberdeen, 1911-24), ii, pp.190-1. 
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and then relied upon them to diffuse Lowland values and government authority.64  
The role of lordship will be discussed below, but what is already apparent is that the 
Covenanting regime in the far north was considerably more sophisticated than 
Goodare’s model allows.  It was able to exploit a range of channels, old and new, 
official and otherwise, to heighten its presence.  Significantly, this accords exactly 
with Stevenson’s assessment of Covenanting governance more generally: 
 
The covenanters had no wish to destroy the old structure; parts were taken 
over and allowed to contine much as before, parts were by-passed or virtually 
replaced but nonetheless allowed to continue to exist nominally.65 
 
Covenanting government in the northern Highlands, then, worked upon exactly the 
same principles as guided the movement further south.  This was not an alien region 
treated as qualitatively different from the rest of the country; it was simply another 
locality, approached like any other.  
 Messy as the Covenanters’ governing framework was in the north, it did enjoy 
some success in heightening the authority of the centre.  Indeed, the Chronicles of the 
Fraser paints an almost Orwellian picture: 
 
Though many would willingly rise and act for the king, [they] are forced to lurk 
and be quiet, haveing so powerfull an adversary to grapple with, a heavy yock 
uppon their necks, and enslaved to a submission; garrisones everywhere over 
their heads, troupes of horse quartered up and down the country.66 
 
                                                 
64 Goodare, Government of Scotland, pp.242-5. 
65 Stevenson, Government of Scotland, p.xlvii. 
66 Fraser, Wardlaw, pp.321-2. 
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That this was not wholly artistic licence is shown by a letter of 1646, in which 
Sutherland warned Balnagown that he should not attempt to manipulate the military 
levies imposed by the government, because ‘in thir dayes it is dangerous to dissobey 
the estates orders’.67  Equally, there was a clear understanding that Edinburgh 
represented a legitimate higher authority to which appeals could be made.  For 
example, when a dispute arose between Thomas Mackenzie of Inverleal and the 
Committee of War for Ross over the former’s alleged refusal to offer assurances for 
keeping the peace, both parties sought to bolster their cause by addressing petitions to 
Parliament.68  The government, for its part, was not afraid of taking firm action as a 
means of imposing conformity, and in the northern Highlands, the Mackays of Reay 
were its primary targets.  In 1644, James Livingstone, 1st earl of Callander, was 
ordered to arrest Reay and his associates as ‘unnaturall cuntriemen’, while five years 
later, David Leslie, one of the leading Covenanting generals, was ordered completely 
to disarm the still recalcitrant Mackay lands of Strathnaver.69  Clearly, the far north 
had little problem recognising not only the power of the Covenanting government, but 
its legitimate claim to hegemony over the Scottish polity, while the government itself 
had few compunctions about exercising its authority. 
 However, that authority could only be exercised in the face of substantial 
challenges, not least of which was the age-old problem of distance.  So remote was 
the north that, in 1647, it was decided to allocate an extra pair of shoes to each of 
three hundred soldiers dispatched to Sutherland, on account of ‘the lenth of the jorney 
thither and of the tryll and trouble they will be put to’.70  By the same token, local 
variation complicated any attempts to implement a uniform system of national 
                                                 
67 MacGill, Old Ross, i, pp.222-3. 
68 RPS, A1649/5/28; A1649/5/43. 
69 Ibid., 1644/6/56; NAS, PA11/8,  fo.76. 
70 NAS, PA11/5. 
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government.  In 1641, the rule that shire commissioners to Parliament have their 
expenses paid solely by taxing Crown freeholders within their shire was overturned 
for Sutherland, because only two individuals there held their lands directly from the 
king, while in 1649 Caithness sought to extend the franchise beyond its conventional 
restriction to freeholders, because there were simply too few of these to constitute an 
adequate electorate.71  There was of course nothing especially ‘Highland’ about these 
kinds of local peculiarities, but they probably explain the apparent anomaly that 
decentralisation remained as crucial to the Covenanters as it had been for previous 
regimes.  At the beginning of the period, the Privy Council decided it was 
inconvenient for the newly-appointed sheriffs of Inverness and Caithness to travel to 
the capital for giving their oaths of office, and therefore gave commissions allowing 
Seaforth and George Gordon, 2nd marquess of Huntly to receive these oaths locally.72  
Moreover, there was a clear reliance on local, particularly church, bodies for carrying 
out government business.  For example, between 1649 and 1651 the presbytery of 
Dingwall took responsibility for hearing, sentencing and absolving all those classed as 
malignants under the Act of Classes (legislation passed in 1649 and aiming to exclude 
all but the most zealous Covenanters from public office), with most of these cases 
never leaving the presbytery.73  If this illustrates the importance of delegation, it also 
reinforces the striking lack of differentiation between the far north and the rest of the 
country – after all, as Allan Macinnes points out, the exploitation of parishes and 
presbyteries as units of administration was from the very beginning a crucial feature 
of the Covenanting regime throughout Scotland.74  
 It must also be understood that consensus-building was just as important as 
                                                 
71 RPS, 1641/8/152; 1649/1/401. 
72 RPCS, vii, pp.102-3. 
73 Mackay, W. (ed.), Records of the Presbyteries of Inverness and Dingwall (Edinburgh, 1896), passim. 
74 Macinnes, A.I., Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement (reprinted Edinburgh, 2003), p.205. 
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raw strength in shoring up government control, and at no time was this tendency 
stronger than during the rebellion led by Thomas Mackenzie of Pluscarden in early 
1649.  On 19 March, the Committee of Estates wrote to Inverness, noting the burgh’s 
loyalty, seeking to ‘render yow thankes for the same’, and cement its future constancy 
by promising that ‘wee shall be redie at all occasionis to make it appeare that wee are 
verie sensible thairof’.75  A month later, as the rebellion spread southwards, the 
Committee wrote to the men of Badenoch and Lochaber, pleading with them to 
remain loyal: 
 
Our earnest care to preserve the Peace of the Kingdome acording to the trust 
reposed in ws, hath moved ws at this time to desyre yow not to suffer your 
selffes to be misled in the way of rebellion by anie specious pretences or false 
suggestions, nor to comply or joyne with anie that shall ryse in armes to the 
disturbance of the peace of the Kingdome.76 
 
On the same day, similar letters were dispatched to the lairds of Freuchie and 
Balnagown.77  Nor was this reliance on persuasion and ‘soft power’ restricted to 1649; 
three years earlier, the Committee had written to the Governor of Inverness, praising 
him for his loyalty and promising that ‘altho our straits and wants of money be great 
at this time’ they would do their utmost to ensure he was properly rewarded.78  The 
government therefore proved itself just as adept at wielding the carrot as the stick, and 
this emphasises the main point: despite the revolutionary and integrationist facade of 
the Covenanting administration, established pressures of distance and local variation 
                                                 
75 NAS, PA11/8, fo.13. 
76 Ibid., fos.41-2. 
77 Ibid., fos.42-5. 
78 NAS, PA11/4, fos.208-9. 
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ensured that consensual, decentralised and often ad hoc strategies were as crucial for 
them as they had been for the Stuart kings. 
Emphasising the continuing balance between centre and periphery was the 
impulse of the revolutionary government to seek the cooperation of the local elite.  
This, of course, was a key feature of the Covenanters’ success across Scotland, and it 
has been argued that the National Covenant itself was, in part at least, a device for 
binding Scotland’s political elite in a common purpose.79  Such party-building was 
vital in the far north too.  In April 1638, for example, the leading Covenanters held a 
meeting at Inverness to which the earl of Sutherland, lord Lovat, lord Reay, James 
Grant of Freuchie, David Ross of Balnagown, and the master of Berriedale (among 
others) were summoned, with a view to explaining the Covenanters’ grievances and 
‘to cleir all doubtis and scruples That may arryse in [th]e mind of ony man not truelie 
informed nor conceaving aricht these materis’.80  The outcome of this exercise 
illustrated how useful elite backing could be in energising the locality, because later 
that month a number of the lords involved declared that ‘we find our selffis 
sufficientlie satisfeit’ and undertook to ‘communicat the samen with the whole 
gentrie, ministers, and borrowis of the schyris of Caithnes, Sutherland, Invernes, [and] 
Cromartie’.81  Theiss points out that this meeting cannot be taken to reflect the 
ideological stances of the chiefs involved because their signatures were extracted 
under duress.82  This is true, but the very fact that the Covenanters undertook the 
exercise at all illustrates the perceived importance of local co-operation.  Indeed, the 
very survival of the regime could rest upon the loyalty of the provincial leadership, 
and the failure of the marquess of Montrose to recruit men from Caithness during his 
                                                 
79 Stevenson, D., The Scottish Revolution 1637-1644 (Edinburgh, 2003), pp.84-5. 
80 NAS, GD84/2/194. 
81 Fraser, W. (ed.), The Sutherland Book, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1892), ii, pp.169-70. 
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1651 insurrection was attributed to the intrigues of Sutherland, who ‘raised all his 
friends and followers indeavouring to hinder all that were willing to join with him, 
and stop all entercourse tuixt him and his friends’.83  Conversely, elite hostility could 
be paralyzing.  The Solemn League and Covenant (1643) suffered notably from this 
phenomenon: the parishioners of Moy in Inverness-shire delayed signing for more 
than six months because the laird of Mackintosh would not accept it, while in the 
parish of Lochcarron in Ross-shire, the hostility of the local landowner meant that 
subscriptions were still wanting by 1649.84  Clearly, then, the Covenanters were 
deeply concerned about winning the support of north Highland lords, and given how 
important the influence of such men was in determining local responsiveness to the 
revolution, this was an eminently sensible strategy.     
A major tactic for securing elite backing was to appoint family leaders to 
positions within government.  Office-holding clearly had a central place in the 
government structure of the Covenanters, something which is well attested by the 
Estates’ own delineation of what would fall within the jurisdiction of those sitting on 
Shire Committees of War: 
 
The committees…are hereby ordained to labour so far as in them lies to maintain 
unity and love amongst all his majesty's good subjects in these bounds…and if any 
tumult or insurrection break forth in the shire by malignants or other disaffected 
persons, to use all means to compose the same…And in case of any foreign invasion 
by sea or by land, that the colonels and commanders rise in arms with the whole 
strength of the shire, horse and foot, for resisting the same.85 
 
                                                 
83 Fraser, Wardlaw, pp.351-2. 
84 NAS, CH2/553/1, 152-6; Mackay, Inverness and Dingwall, p.150. 
85 RPS, 1643/6.91. 
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Alongside the local executive role of shire committees, the Covenanting regime rested 
upon a network of other appointments in central government (session and interval 
committees, special committees, privy council and officers of state) and in a judicial 
capacity (sheriffships and special commissions).  Table 1 displays the total 
appointments in each of these categories made to the heads of major kindreds, usually 
the chief but in a small number of cases the tutor or de facto leader.86 
 
Table 1: Office-holding amongst heads of families in the northern Highlands, 1638-
5187 
 
As this data illustrates, the Covenanters moved beyond seeking merely the 
acquiescence of local elites, and in the case of each of the major northern kindreds it 
attempted to win local support by actively involving the leadership in the business of 
                                                 
86 Sir John Sinclair of Dunbeath was not technically a tutor.  The two Sinclair chiefs of this period provided little 
leadership; the aged 5th earl of Caithness was reclusive, and the young 6th earl was warded by a largely absent 
conglomerate of Lowland lords.  Dunbeath was, however, the most active and influential of the Sinclair gentry.  
The Royalist kindreds of Mackay and Urquhart are not included. 
87 See appendix for a list of the offices and office-holders considered in compiling the tables.   





Chisholm Alexander Chisholm of Comar (C) 
 
0 1 0 1 
Fraser Sir James Fraser of Brea (T) 
 
3 3 3 9 
Gordon John Gordon, 13th earl of 
Sutherland (C) 
12 2 4 18 
Grant Sir John Grant of Freuchie (C) 
 
2 3 0 5 
Gunn Alexander Gunn of Killearnan (C) 
 
0 1 0 1 
Mackenzie George Mackenzie, 2nd earl of 
Seaforth (C) 
5 0 5 10 
Macleod Donald Macleod of Assynt (C) 
 
0 2 0 2 
Munro Robert Munro of Obsdale (T) 
 
2 7 0 9 
Ross David Ross of Balnagown (C) 
 
1 5 1 7 
Sinclair Sir John Sinclair of Dunbeath (T) 
 
2 6 2 10 
Total 
 
 27 30 15 72 
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government.  Unsurprisingly, the bulk of these appointments went to the most 
powerful chiefs, the earls of Seaforth and Sutherland, John Sinclair of Dunbeath and 
James Fraser of Brea prominent among them, and it is equally unsurprising that the 
highly motivated Sutherland hoarded far more offices than anyone else.  But it is also 
telling that local executive appointments were the most widely distributed.  This 
confirms that the perceived role of family elites was to help diffuse Covenanting 
authority into the periphery, even if certain individuals (especially Sutherland) were 
highly active in central government.  Here again there is little difference between the 
far north and the rest of Scotland; the preponderance of Hamiltons on the Committees 
of War for Lanarkshire, the Kerrs on those for Roxburgh-shire or the Kennedys in 
Ayrshire illustrates the ubiquity of local elites as intermediaries of the Covenanting 
regime.88 
 However, the raw figures conceal important chronological variations.  Table 2, 
using the same data, sets out appointment patterns over time, comparing the 






















Chisholm 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Fraser 3 7 3 14 1 5 2 0 0 0 
Sutherland 
Men 
3 16 6 25 2 13 6 2 1 5 
Grant 2 2 3 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Gunn 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mackenzie 7 4 3 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Macleod 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Munro 0 0 6 3 2 4 1 0 0 0 
Ross 2 1 4 3 1 9 0 0 0 0 
Sinclair 2 13 3 27 2 9 3 2 0 0 
Total 18 43 31 84 9 46 12 4 1 5 
Table 2: Chronological Variation in familial office-holding in the northern 
Highlands, 1638-51 
                                                 
88 RPS, 1663/6/91; Stevenson, Government of Scotland, p.xlvi. 
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It is of course important to recognise the limitations of this data and by extension the 
interpretive restrictions that must be imposed.  The ten groups were not of comparable 
size, and it is hardly a revelation to find the tiny clan Chisholm lagging behind more 
populous families such as the Sinclairs.  In the absence of detailed data regarding the 
precise numbers of potential office-holders in each group, the figures can only be used 
to arrive at broad and impressionistic conclusions about familial attachment to the 
Covenanting cause.  Yet if attention is focused on the aims and strategies of central 
government, a number of more precise points can be made.  It is telling that the Civil 
War period (1644-7) was the most fruitful and diverse in terms of familial office 
holding.  That the widening of government reliance on family structures coincided 
with the Royalist insurrection indicates a belief on the part of the authorities that 
appropriating the pre-existing influence of the regional elite offered the best chance of 
preserving Covenanting rule.  Equally, in terms of raw numbers, familial involvement 
in office-holding fell away noticeably from 1647, implying that the far north did not 
escape the factionalism of the later Covenanting movement.  Indeed, support for the 
radical ‘Kirk Party’ was particularly narrow, attracting the involvement of just four 
groups as opposed to the totals of nine and eight enjoyed by the pre-1648 and 
Engagement regimes respectively.   
Moreover, comparing leaders’ office-holding patterns with those of lesser men 
more generally reveals much about the effectiveness of courting local elites as a 
strategy of control.  Prior to 1648, fluctuations in the office-holding patterns of lesser 
men tended to mirror the involvement of their individual leaders, so that, as chiefs 
took on more offices, so did their dependents.  There were exceptions, notably with 
the Mackenzies, whose haul of offices doubled between the national and civil war 
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regimes even though Seaforth’s personal involvement decreased, but the general 
picture suggests that the government strategy of securing control indirectly through 
local lords was working.  After 1648, however, the situation changed markedly.  That 
the Engagement regime attracted vastly more support from gentry than chiefs, 
especially in the cases of the Frasers, Rosses, Sinclairs and Sutherland men, indicates 
not only a weakening of chiefly control, but that the Engagement drew much of its 
support in the far north from men of middling rank.  The ‘Kirk Party’ support 
structure was almost a complete mirror-image, so that leaders such as Sutherland, 
Brea and Dunbeath (it is noteworthy that these latter two were only de facto leaders 
rather than full chiefs) got involved but failed to take their followers with them.  The 
role of north Highland lords was therefore a complex one.  Such individuals exercised 
enormous influence over the locality, and the government actively sought both their 
endorsement and active cooperation.  While the Covenanting movement itself 
retained its homogeneity, this strategy proved largely successful in diffusing the 
authority of government.  Yet with the splintering of the movement from 1648, the 
success of indirect control faltered, with leaders and their followers often gravitating 
towards different factions.  This is significant for two reasons.  Firstly, it illustrates 
that the influence of provincial lords over the locality, though extensive, was not all-
embracing.  Secondly, it highlights that the Covenanters, like James VI and Charles I, 
had to accept that ruling through regional elites could only guarantee local 
responsiveness if the government itself was able to command a general public 
consensus.  
  The fluctuations in office-holding after 1648 are noteworthy for another 
reason.  The pattern of humbler support for the Engagement and elite backing for the 
‘Kirk Party’ represents a total inversion of the national picture as it is conventionally 
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drawn.  Hitherto it has been assumed that the Engagement drew its strength from 
aristocrats, while the ‘Kirk Party’ was sustained by men of lesser standing, especially 
gentry and clerics.89  Indeed some have gone further; Walter Makey argues that the 
‘Kirk Party’ regime was an alliance between gentry and clergy that used ‘a feudal 
parliament to attack feudalism itself’ – a quintessential bourgeois revolution.90  There 
is certainly evidence that the Kirk assumed a more prominent role in the government 
of the far north after 1648, especially in terms of enforcing ideological conformity – 
the Kirk session of Petty in Inverness presbytery, for example, summoned all 
suspected ‘malignants’ to ‘be at the presbeterie the next day to cleir themselfes’ in 
October 164991 – but office-holding data suggests that this was not accompanied by a 
movement away from traditional chiefly and aristocratic control, probably because the 
northern elite had largely not served the Engagement.  Escaping any disgrace at 
Preston in August 1648, they avoided being sidelined thereafter.  There was, 
therefore, no call for the kind of radical, lower-order governance that exemplified 
‘Kirk Party’ hegemony elsewhere.  In other words, in as much as there was any 
expansion of the church’s power in the northern Highlands in these years, it should be 
understood as reflecting a change in approach from central government, a temporary 
emphasising of ecclesiastical administrative structures over those of the secular state.  
Beyond this, however, the traditional ruling elite of the north retained its dominance.  
If this says something about the resilience of family leaders, it also raises questions 
about just how far the regime of 1649-50 represented a genuine subversion of 
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aristocratic power, and certainly about the veracity of Makey’s bourgeois revolution 
thesis. 
However, if the major families played an important part in government office-
holding, they did not have a monopoly.  Table 3 compares the relative prominence in 
official appointments of those who did and those who did not belong to one of the 
major kin networks:92 
 




  No. % No. % No. % 
Executive: Central 54 42 77.8 9 16.7 3 5.6 
Executive: Local 348 189 54.3 60 17.2 99 28.4 
Judicial 54 38 70.4 6 11.1 10 18.5 
Representative 60 30 50.0 26 43.3 4 6.7 
Total 516 299 57.9 101 19.6 116 22.5 
Table 3: Familial vs. non-familial office-holding in the northern Highland, 1638-51 
 
The major kindreds certainly secured an impressive degree of representation, and their 
supremacy in terms of central and judicial office-holding was especially striking.  
Similarly, although affiliates of the major families only secured 50% of representative 
offices overall, this is skewed by the fact that gentry and burgesses constituted 
separate parliamentary estates; viewed exclusively in terms of gentry representation, 
their share was nearly 90%.  Nevertheless, the role of individuals outwith the major 
family networks, gathering more than two-fifths of appointments in total, cannot be 
discounted.  The burgesses, indeed, retained a relatively constant hold over between 
one-tenth and one-fifth of all office-types, excepting of course the special case of 
parliamentary representation.  Gentry without links to major family networks were 
                                                 
92 ‘Representative’ refers to burgh and shire commissioners to Parliament, while all other classes of office are 
defined as in Table 1 above.  ‘Clan affiliates’ in this case refers to those families discussed in Tables 1 and 2 
above.  In the absence of appointment lists, this data does not include the Justices of the Peace appointed after 
1649.  However, if the patterns of appointment followed by earlier commissions were repeated, it can be assumed 
that the trends highlighted in the table were borne out by Justice of the Peace appointments. 
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rather more erratic, but their poor showing in central and representative office was 
offset by strong positions in local and judicial office.  The major families, then, 
should be recognised as the most significant of a range of social groups employed by 
the Covenanting authorities to sustain their administrative systems.   
 Beyond these general points, though, it is important to recognise the scope for 
local variation.  The best means of tracing regional patterns is to concentrate on the 
Committees of War, since these were the only bodies with explicitly defined local 
jurisdictions.  Table 4 charts the role of family affiliates, burgesses and non-familial 
gentry in the committees appointed for Caithness, Sutherland and Inverness and Ross 








  No. % No. % No. % 
Caithness 102 50 49 31 20.1 21 30.4 
Inverness and Ross 216 117 68.5 64 16.2 35 30.6 
Sutherland 73 50 53.4 18 6.8 5 26.7 
Table 4: Local Variation in Committees of War, 1643-51  
 
In general terms, the patterns were broadly similar.  In each case, family affiliates 
formed the largest single group, followed by other gentry and then burgesses.  
Considered in more detail, however, these figures can be seen to reflect the social 
composition of each shire.  In each, independent gentry were of roughly similar 
prominence, dominated by Cogles and Caddells in Caithness, Murrays in Sutherland, 
and Roses, Dunbars and Inneses in Inverness and Ross.  More striking variation was 
evident in burgh participation, for which Sutherland, with just one burgh at Dornoch, 
was particularly infertile terrain.  The Caithness towns of Thurso and Wick produced 
a notably more active class of men, and burgesses took over one-fifth of offices.  The 
burgess class of Inverness-shire and Ross, spread across Inverness, Cromarty, Tain 
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and Dingwall, was only marginally less prominent, with the burgesses of Inverness 
(Forbes, Cuthbert and Baillie) and Tain (McCulloch and Tulloch) taking most of their 
16% share.  Equally telling was the division of offices between the individual 
families.  In Caithness, the Sinclairs secured fully 94% of those offices allocated to 
members of the leading families, with just two other groups – Munro and Sutherland 
– sharing the remaining 6%.  In Sutherland, the kin of the Gordon earl gathered 24% 
of appointments, while his two client families of Sutherland and Grey won an 
additional 46% between them.  The much less homogenous tapestry of territories in 
Ross and Inverness was reflected in their more complex patterns of office-holding; 
fully 14 families shared the spoils, with only the Rosses and Frasers getting more than 
a one-tenth proportion.  In the same way that employing family leaders was aimed at 
appropriating a pre-existing power structure, the Committees of War were clearly 
designed to exploit established networks of influence and authority by reproducing 
local society in microcosm.  That this tendency went so far as to reflect the relative 
strength of the major kindreds within their home shires confirms the role of these 
groups as one means of cementing Covenanting authority. 
The relationship between government and the major northern families was 
made possible by the fact that the former could rely upon a high degree of loyalty 
from the latter; the kindreds of Sinclair, Gunn, Gordon, Sutherland, Gray, Munro, 
Ross, Fraser and Chisholm all remained loyal throughout the period, compared to just 
two Royalist families (Mackay and Urquhart) and three whose commitments switched 
at least once (Mackenzie, Grant and Macleod of Assynt).  These patterns cannot be 
written off as mere titular adherence.  In 1649, the Committee of Estates praised 
Balnagown’s ‘affection to the cause and good deservingis of the Publict quhereof yow 
have given such reall proofe’ as well as his ‘readines to oppose the designes of all 
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such as wald disturbe the quiet of the Kingdome’, and in the same year, similarly 
glowing recognition was accorded to Sutherland, Lovat, the laird of Dunvegan, the 
laird of Grant, the burgh of Inverness, and the heritors of Ross-shire and Inverness-
shire.93  Such observations, however, do little to address the most significant 
historiographical debate regarding Highland engagement with the Covenanting 
movement, namely the relative importance of ideology and pragmatism in guiding 
loyalties.  The more old-fashioned reading (based largely on the situation in the 
western Highlands) was that self-interest ruled all, as in the analyses of Cowan and 
Theiss, cited above, that the clans simply used the Covenanting-Royalist dynamic as 
cover for pursuing private and local agendas.94  Yet amongst some senior members of 
the leading families, there is clear evidence of the more high-minded attitudes 
identified by Furgol.  In a letter to his father in 1638, the master of Berriedale, a 
grandson of the 5th earl of Caithness, explained his endorsement of the Covenant in 
distinctly ideological terms:  
 
I am sorie…that [y]e sie not the coruptiouns crieping in and gods worship 
already begun to be corupted, with human inventiouns, and christ rubbed of 
his spouse, and his freindis of thair christian Liberties, and his cause borne 
doun with authority.95  
 
Similarly, the eulogy of Brea, the de facto head of the Lovat Frasers for much of the 
1640s, given in the Chronicles of the Fraser, stressed that ‘he had strong convictions 
uppon his soul’ and consequently was always ‘runing too much with the streame of 
                                                 
93 NAS, PA11/8, fos.13, 42, 44, 74, 164; RPS, 1649/1/409, 1649/5/183, 1649/5/253. 
94 Cowan, Montrose, p.181; Theiss, ‘Western Highlands’, p.119. 
95 NLS, Wodrow Collection, Quarto xxiv, 8, fo.69. 
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the times, and too great a madler with state affaires’.96  Any attempt to account for the 
patterns of adherence amongst the north Highland families must therefore accept that 
at least part of the explanation lies in the ideological sensibilities of individual lords or 
tutors. 
Yet the veracity of the older historiographical model should also be 
acknowledged, not least because there was no absolute correlation between religious 
ideology and political affiliation.  Thus, the presbyterian Mackays supported the King, 
the Roman Catholic Chisholms were Covenanters (though not terribly active ones) 
and the episcopalian Mackenzies vacillated between the two.97  Pragmatic 
considerations guided north Highland involvement with the Covenanting movement 
in two broad ways.  The first was protection of property and position.  When the 
gentry of Caithness wrote to lord Reay in 1646, seeking to find out ‘giue yow be 
Myndfull to joyne q[ui]th Montroes or till Invaid Sutherland’, they did so not out of 
concern for the security of the Covenanting regime, but ‘to now how [we] shall be 
assured peace concludit betuixt yo[u]r lo[rdshi]p yo[u]r Countray men [and] ws’.98  
Caithness also provides a striking example of how the desire to protect personal 
position could distract nominal Covenanters from carrying out government orders.  In 
1644, Sutherland complained that such behaviour from the Sinclairs was hindering the 
military effort against Montrose: 
 
The Laird of Murkell in Cathnes, who is conwiner off ther committee off war, 
doth always forslowe them in that shyre, and not only hinder them, bot by his 
                                                 
96 Fraser, Wardlaw, p.384. 
97 Macinnes, Clanship, pp.248-9. 
98 NAS, GD96/561/3. 
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reports off [in]wasione off my Lord off Reay and others by sea, and throghe 
the fears off the Clane Donald from the west, puts all others in suche feares.99 
 
The second pragmatic stimulus was inter-family enmity.  Deciding which side to join 
often followed the fault-lines carved out by old rivalries.  For instance, an attack by 
the Royalist Macdonalds on the lands of the Covenanting Frasers in 1644 mirrored an 
earlier altercation between the two families, in which the former had been 
ignominiously defeated.100  The war could also provide a useful cover for advancing 
on-going disputes, and in 1647 Assynt used the Royalism of the Mackenzies to freeze 
all outstanding legal proceeding initiated against him by that family, while raising 
fresh citations of his own.101  The crucial point, of course, is that national and local 
interests were never wholly distinct.  Huntly suggested as much in 1647 when he 
wrote to inform Reay of the king’s surrender: 
 
In the meane tyme let not the present fare of thing moue you to abstaine from 
prosecuting your owne Iust affaires with any of your neighboures, for you may 
be Confident that his Ma[jes]ties affaires wilbe carried On and to the 
satisfaction of all his faithfull subjectes.102 
 
Loyalties were therefore decided by a mixture of principled commitment and private 
interest.  Luckily for the Covenanters, it so happened that this combination caused 
most northern kindreds to lean in favour of the revolutionary government.  
                                                 
99 Fraser, Sutherland Book, ii, pp.171-3. 
100 Fraser, Wardlaw, pp.289-90. 
101 NAS, PA11/5. 
102 NAS, GD84/2/207. 
 34 
There is a clear case for arguing that the northern Highlands in the 
Covenanting period boasted a distinct identity, the dominant feature of which was 
hybridism.  The kind of structures and trends normally associated with clan society 
were certainly in evidence, but only in intimate partnership with Lowland norms.   
Moreover, if it is clear that some elements of this lordly culture – such as feuding and 
kin networks – had the potential for causing dislocation from the wider Scottish 
polity, none of them were significant enough during the Covenanting era to make 
such estrangement a reality.  The point of all this is that the ‘Highland’ nature of the 
far north – or, more precisely, the degree of separateness implied by its hybrid identity 
– should not be overstated.  This crucially informs any assessment of the 
Covenanters’ system of local administration, for the existence of a recognisable 
government structure, incorporating tradition alongside innovation, and adept at 
exploiting all and any channels for transmitting its authority – a hybrid system to 
match a hybrid society – meant that the far north was firmly within the boundaries of 
the Scottish state, rather than being disregarded or relegated to the status of an internal 
colony.  Even more importantly, this government structure relied, as it did throughout 
Scotland, on the active co-operation of local elites, especially, but not exclusively, 
lords and family leaders.  As a strategy this was not foolproof, especially after 1647, 
but the authorities were fortunate in enjoying a high degree of adherence and active 
loyalty in the far north, predicated on a mixture of opportunism and principle.  This, 
indeed, was the cornerstone of Covenanting government in the far north as elsewhere; 
indirect rule reliant upon the use of local elites as intermediaries for transmitting and 
sustaining central authority.  The revolutionary government in the northern Highlands 
was, in other words, sustained in exactly the same way as it was farther south, by 
carefully reshaping classic Stuart mechanisms of control.  
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Where then does the north-Highland experience fit on the broader canvas of 
centre-periphery relations in seventeenth-century Europe?  The employment of 
indirect strategies of control, the exploitation of regional social and political 
structures, and the accommodation of cultural diversity all point towards an 
emphatically ‘collaborative’ relationship between Edinburgh and the far north.  This 
is significant because the Covenanting period was clearly marked by robust increases 
in the reach and sophistication of Scottish central government, not least as regards the 
institution of Parliament.  The northern Highlands, then, provide an example of non-
linear progression, in which bureaucratic reform and administrative radicalism were 
offset by a cautious relationship with pre-existing mechanisms of local authority.  
There are parallels here with continental historiography, notably William Beik’s study 
of Languedoc, which twenty years ago reached a broadly similar conclusion about 
Bourbon France.103  But if consideration of the Covenanters’ relationship with the 
northern Highlands does not reveal anything inherently original, it does add an 
unusual and under-utilised perspective to a familiar debate, a perspective which, in 
illustrating the extent to which the diffusion of authority underlay the power of the 
revolutionary government in Scotland, also highlights the complexity and ambiguity 
of the state-building process in early-modern Europe.  
                                                 
103 Beik, W., Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in 
Languedoc (Cambridge, 1997, first published 1985). 
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Appendix: Offices and Office-holders 
 
The following lists the raw data upon which the statistical information in 
tables one to three is based.  The bulk of it is drawn from the parliamentary record.  It 
does not represent a comprehensive inventory of all governmental or administrative 
offices in existence under the Covenanters, but only includes those that involved 
northern Highland individuals.  Moreover, it is limited by the sources, and only covers 




Office Type Office 
Executive: Central Committee of Estates 
Committee of Revisions 
Committee of Losses 
Committee for the North 
Privy Council 
Committee for Distressed Ministers 
Subcommittee anent Idle Beggars 
Committee to Gather Subscriptions to the Covenant 
Committee for the Affairs of the Army 
Committee for the Plantation of Kirks 
Lord Privy Seal 
Committee for Reports 
Committee for the Valuation of Teinds 
Executive: Local Committee of War for Caithness 
Committee of War for Elgin, Nairn and Inverness 
                                                 
104 RPS, 1643/6/91, 1644/6/182, 1644/6/225, 1645/1/181, 1645/7/24/87, 1646/11/34, 1646/11/356, 1646/11/364, 
1646/11/532, 1648/3/79, 1648/3/210, 1648/3/213, 1649/1/87, 1649/1/255, 1649/1/293, 1649/1/309, 1649/1/335, 
1649/5/376, A1650/5/116, A1650/11/20, A1651/3/16, A1651/5/8, M1650/11/3 and at M1651/5/4; RPCS, vii, 
p.102, pp.164-70, p.180, pp.288-92 and at p.335; Stevenson, Government of Scotland, p.82; Young, M. D. (ed.), 
The Parliaments of Scotland: Burgh and Shire Commissioners, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1992), ii, p.772, pp.778-9, 
pp.787-8, p.791, p.795 and at p.800.   
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Committee of War for Inverness and Sutherland 
Committee of War for Inverness 
Committee of War for Sutherland 
Judicial Commission to Apprehend Jesuits 
Commission to Conduct Perambulations 
Commission to Hold Justice Courts 
Commission to Suppress Criminals in the Highlands 
Commission to Transfer the Laird of Drum 
Commission for the Burnt and Wasted Lands of Inverness-shire 
Committee for those in the Castle 
Sherriff-Clerk of Caithness 
Sheriff Principal of Caithness 
Sheriff Principal of Inverness 
Sheriff Principal of Ross 
Sheriff Principal of Sutherland 
Representative Commissioner to Parliament for Caithness 
Commissioner to Parliament for Dornoch (burgh) 
Commissioner to Parliament for Inverness (burgh) 
Commissioner to Parliament for Inverness-shire 
Commissioner to Parliament for Ross-shire 
Commissioner to Parliament for Sutherland 




Family Affiliations Name Social Status 
Cameron Ewan Cameron of Locheil Laird 
Campbell Archibald Campbell, 1st marquess of Argyll Noble 
Patrick Campbell of Boath Laird 
Chisholm  Alexander Chisholm of Comar Laird 
Fraser of Lovat Alexander Fraser, tutor of Lovar Laird 
Hugh Fraser of Belladrum Laird 
Hugh Fraser of Foyers Laird 
Hugh Fraser of Kinneries Laird 
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Hugh Fraser, 7th lord Lovat Noble 
Hugh Fraser, master of Lovat Laird 
Hugh Fraser of Struy Laird 
Sir James Fraser of Brae Laird 
Simon Fraser, master of Lovat Laird 
Thomas Fraser of Strichen Laird 
William Fraser of Culboky Laird 
Gordon (of Huntly) George Gordon, 2nd marquess of Huntly Noble 
George Gordon, lord Gordon Noble 
Gordon (of Sutherland) Alexander Gordon of Carrell Laird 
George Gordon of Sutherland Laird 
Sir John Gordon of Embo Laird 
John Gordon, 14th earl of Suterhland Noble 
Hugh Gordon of Drumjoy Laird 
Sir Robert Gordon Laird 
William Gordon of Doil Laird 
Grant John Grant of Ballindalloch Laird 
Sir John Grant of Freuchie Laird 
John Grant of Gillewappil Laird 
John Grant of Lurg Laird 
John Grant of Moyness Laird 
Gray Alexander Gray of Ospisdale Laird 
Alexander Gray of Spinnigsdale Laird 
Robert Gray Laird 
Robert Gray of Ballone Laird 
Robert Gray of Culmaily Laird 
Robert Gray of Skibo Laird 
Robert Gray of Swordale Laird 
Gunn Alexander Gunn of Kilearnan Laird 
Macdonald Sir Donald Macdonald of Sleat Laird 
Mackay Hugh Mackay of Scourie Laird 
William Mackay of Bighouse Laird 
Mackenzie Alexander Mackenzie of Kilcowie Laird 
George Munro, 2nd earl of Seaforth Noble 
Sir John Mackenzie of Tarbat Laird 
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Rory Mackenzie of Redcastle Laird 
Simon Mackenzie of Lochslin Laird 
George Mackenzie, younger of Tarbat Laird 
Thomas Mackenzie of Pluscarden Laird 
Mackintosh Lachlan Mackintosh Laird 
James Mackintosh of Thorneagrane Laird 
William Mackintosh of that Ilk Laird 
William Mackintosh of Holm Laird 
William Mackintosh of Killachie Laird 
William Mackintosh of Torcastle Laird 
Macleod Neil Macleod of Assynt Laird 
Sir John Macleod of Dunvegan Laird 
Rory Macleod of Dunvegan Laird 
Rory Macleod of Talister Laird 
Macpherson Alexander Macpherson of Esig Laird 
Dougal Macpherson Burgess 
Munro David Munro Burgess 
David Munro of Buckies Laird 
Hugh Munro of Contullich Laird 
John Munro of Lamlair Laird 
Neil Munro of Findon Laird 
Sir Robert Munro of Obsdale/Foulis Laird 
Ross David Ross of Balnagown Laird 
David Ross of Holm Laird 
James Ross of Pettindreich Laird 
John Ross of Aldie Laird 
John Ross of Markness Laird 
Thomas Ross of Priesthill Laird 
Walter Ross of Invercharron Laird 
William Ross of Clava Laird 
William Ross of Grunyard Laird 
David Ross of Pitcalnie Laird 
Sinclair Alexander Sinclair of Lathrone Laird 
Alexander Sinclair of Rachlow Laird 
David Sinclair Laird 
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Francis Sinclair of Northfield Laird 
Francis Sinclair of Tasbuster Laird 
George Sinclair, 5th earl of Caithness Noble 
James Sinclair of Brims Ness Laird 
James Sinclair of Broum Laird 
Sir James Sinclair of Canisbay Laird 
James Sinclair of Forse Laird 
James Sinclair of Kelter Laird 
Sir James Sinclair of Murkle Laird 
James Sinclair of Ratter Laird 
John Sinclair of Assery Laird 
John Sinclair, master of Berriedale Laird 
Sir John Sinclair of Dunbeath Laird 
Sir John Sinclair of Hermiston Laird 
John Sinclair of Tennache Laird 
Patrick Sinclair Laird 
Patrick Sinclair of Ulbster Laird 
Sir William Sinclair of Catboll Laird 
William Sinclair of Lun Laird 
Sutherland Alexander Sutherland of Duffus Laird 
James Sutherland of Forse Laird 
John Sutherland of Clyne Laird 
John Sutherland of Kinsteary Laird 
Urquhart Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromarty Laird 
Other George Abernethy Burgess 
William Baillie of Dunean Burgess 
Duncan Bain of Kilmore Burgess 
John Bain of Tulloch Burgess 
Alexander Brodie of that Ilk Laird 
Alexander Brodie of Lethane Laird 
Alexander Bruce of Holland Burgess 
Walter Bruce of Ham Burgess 
William Bruce of Holm Laird 
William Bruce of Stansell Laird 
David Budge Burgess 
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Charles Caddell of Lynegar Laird 
Alexander Cogle of that Ilk Laird 
David Cogle Laird 
John Corbett of Litlerani Laird 
John Cunningham of Bremhill Laird 
John Cuthbert of Drakies Burgess 
John Cuthbert of Castlehill Burgess 
Captain James Davidson Unknown 
John Davidson Burgess 
Hector Douglas of Mulderg Gentry 
Alexander Dunbar of Bennatfield Gentry 
Alexander Dunbar of Boath Gentry 
Alexander Dunbar of Westfield Gentry 
Ninian Dunbar of Grange Gentry 
Robert Dunbar of Easterfield Gentry 
Thomas Dunbar, tutor of Grange Gentry 
William Dollas of Cantra Gentry 
Duncan Forbes of Culloden Burgess 
Alexander Forrester of Colinald Burgess 
Alexander Forrester of Edderton Burgess 
Sir George Hamilton of Blackburn Gentry 
John Hay Burgess 
John Hay of Knockcoudie Burgess 
Alexander Innes of Borrowstone Gentry 
Major James Innes Unknown 
James Innes of Sandside Gentry 
John Innes of Thirsetter Gentry 
Robert Innes Burgess 
Robert Innes of Culrossie Gentry 
Sir Robert Innes of that Ilk Gentry 
Captain William Innes Unknown 
William Innes of Borlum Gentry 
Walter Innes of Inverbreakie Gentry 
Lieutenant Colonel James Jack Unknown 
Thomas Kinnaird of Cowbin Gentry 
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Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Leslie Unknown 
Captain Laurence Lundie Unknown 
Thomas Manson Burgess 
Alexander McAlexander Burgess 
Angus McBain of Tordarroch Burgess 
John McBain of Kinkell Burgess 
Andrew McCulloch of Glastulloch Burgess 
James McCulloch Burgess 
Thomas McCulloch Burgess 
Alexander Mullikan Burgess 
John Murray of Pennyland Burgess 
Robert Murray Burgess 
Robert Murray of Pulrossie Gentry 
Robert Murray of Spinnigsdale Gentry 
Robert Murray of Thurso Gentry 
Walter Murray of Abercorse Burgess 
Walter Murray of Pitgurdie Gentry 
Walter Murray Burgess 
John Polson Burgess 
William Robertson of Inshes Burgess 
Hugh Rose of Kilravock Gentry 
Hugh Rose of Little Torsell Gentry 
James Rose of Merkinch Burgess 
Thomas Shives of Muirton Burgess 
James Stuart, 4th earl of Moray Noble 
Walter Swinton Burgess 
Thomas Tulloch Burgess 
 
